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VIEWS ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE WITH
PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO LAW AND ECONOMICS,
NEW YORK, AND NORTH CAROLINA
Sydney M. Cone, 1U"
This Article-after describing analytical gaps in the work of the
ABA Commission on MDP, and after criticizing the analysis of
MDP by the law and economics school and the Big Five subset
thereof-sets forth, with commentary, proposals relating to
MDP developed by the New York State Bar Association and the
MDP Task Force of the North Carolina Bar Association. It
concludes by comparing these proposals in the context of the
law governing lawyers in the United States.
THE ABA's ANALYTICAL GAP
On July 11, 2000, the American Bar Association ("ABA),
through its governing body, the House of Delegates, took two votes
relating to multidisciplinary practice ("MDP"), which effectively re-
pudiated the position recommended by the ABA's Commission on
MDP (the "ABA Commission").! The first vote rejected a procedural
motion supported by the ABA Commission to defer a vote on the
merits. The second vote approved a recommendation sponsored by
several state bar associations which were substantively opposed to
the position of the ABA Commission. The second vote also put an
end to the existence of the ABA Commission.2
* C.V. Starr Professor of Law, New York Law School; Counsel, Cleary, Gottlieb,
Steen & Hamilton; Member of the New York Bar; Member of the North Caro-
lina Bar 1959-1999 (inactive status thereafter).
1. See ABA Comm'n on Multidisciplinary Practice, House of Delegates
Annual Meeting 7/11/00 Transcript, available at http//www.abanet.org/epr/
mdp...hotrans.html [hereinafter Annual Meeting Transcript].
2. See id.; ABA Comm'n on Multidisciplinary Practice, MDP Report 10F,
available at http-//www.abanet.org/cpr/mdp-reportlOf.html [hereinafter MDP
Report 10F]. The motion to defer was defeated by a vote of 262 against, 152 for.
The second vote was on a recommendation (in the form of Report 10F to the
House of Delegates) by bar associations of (in alphabetical order) Florida, Illi-
nois, New Jersey, New York, and Ohio. See ABA Comm'n on Multidisciplinary
Practice, MDP Recommendation to the House of Delegates (July 2000), avail-
able at http//www.abanet.org/cpr/mdprecomlOF.html [hereinafter MDP Rec-
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For two years, the ABA Commission had been seeking to per-
suade the House of Delegates to approve MDP in what might be
called its ultimate form-a form whereby nonlegal professionals
would be permitted to own or otherwise control legal practices. In
1999, the ABA Commission proposed that such an MDP should be
permitted, provided it was required to certify annually to a state
court that it had complied with the rules governing the legal profes-
sion, and was subject to "administrative audit" by the court.' In
2000, the ABA Commission, abandoning its 1999 approach, indi-
cated that compliance with those rules by such an MDP "[could] be
satisfied in a variety of ways," and effectively recommended that the
several states select from amongst that variety the way or ways that
the states deemed best.
4
Neither the 1999 nor the 2000 proposal of the ABA Commission
was voted on as such by the House of Delegates.5 Instead, by ap-
proving resolutions proposed by state bar groups, the House indi-
cated that the proposals of the ABA Commission were inadequate
and thus unacceptable.6 In 1999, the House cited a need for addi-
tional study of the issues relating to MDP and the legal profession."
In 2000, the House adopted a more detailed resolution clearly disap-
proving-as incompatible with the "core values of the [American] le-
gal profession'"-MDPs in respect of which nonlawyers or nonlegal
entities have "any ownership or investment interest in, or manage-
rial or supervisory right, power or position in connection with, the
practice of law by any lawyer or law firm."'
omnmendation]. It was approved by a vote of 314 in favor, 106 against. John
Gibeaut, 'It's a Done Deal': House of Delegates Vote Crushes Chances for MDP,
A.B.A. J., Sept. 2000, at 92. The recommendation is summarized in the text
two paragraphs below.
3. ABA Comm'n on Multidisciplinary Practice, Report to the House of
Delegates, Recommendation (July 8, 1999), available at http:I/www.abanet.org/
cpr/mdprecommendation.html (issued in June and dated August 1999) [herein-
after Recommendation]. On August 10, 1999, the House of Delegates declined
to adopt the report and, by a vote of 304 to 98, resolved that no change should
be made in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct as they relate to MDP.
John Gibeaut, MDP Debate Still Alive: Need for New Rules, Accord by State
Bars on Lingering Issues, A.B.A. J., October 1999, at 84. Such changes were
rejected "unless and until additional study demonstrates that such changes will
further the public interest." ABA Comm'n on Multidisciplinary Practice, Report
to the House of Delegates (July 2000), available at http'J/www.abanet.org/cpr/
mdpfinalrep2000.html [hereinafter Report to the House of Delegates].
4. Report to the House of Delegates, supra note 3.
5. See id.; Annual Meeting Transcript, supra note 1.
6. See id.
7. Report to the House of Delegates, supra note 3.
8. ABA Comm'n on Multidisciplinary Practice, Report to the House of
Delegates, Final Report, available at http'//www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpreport.html
[hereinafter Final Report] (quoting Report of the New York State Bar Ass'n
Special Committee on the law Governing Firm Structure and Operation, Pre-
serving the Core Values of the American Legal Profession: The Place of Multi-
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The votes by the House of Delegates, while decisive, may not
prove to be definitive. The MDP debate can be expected to continue
against the background of the votes by the House indicating that the
ABA Commission had failed to come up with acceptable proposals,
and removing the ABA Commission from the debate-votes that
may encourage lawyers within both the ABA and state bar groups to
become more analytical in dealing with MDP.
The MDP debate in the United States has focused in large part
on two different types of MIDP: One type has its economic center of
gravity in a sponsoring nonlegal professional firm, notably one of the
firms known as the "Big Five,' seeking to extend its activities to in-
clude the practice of law. The other type comprises a variety of
MDPs proposed by legal practitioners seeking to combine the prac-
tice of law with other professional activities."0
Conceptually, these two types of MDP overlap. As a practical
matter, however, they are rather different, and it is this difference
which the ABA Commission largely failed to analyze and which may
inform the future debate. In an MDP whose economic center of
gravity lies within a predominantly nonlegal entity, that entity's
dominance alone may dictate that the locus of control of legal prac-
tice by the MDP will reside with nonlawyers. In contrast, in MDPs
of the second type, legal practitioners may be more likely to control
or exercise ultimate influence over the economics of the MDP and
thus of its legal practice. The question of economic control of legal
practice becomes highly pertinent in the context of the rules gov-
erning the legal profession, and the place of that profession in the
legal system. Put simply, the question becomes--to what extent is it
reasonable to expect MDPs of each type to act in furtherance of
those rules and that system?
The ABA Commission did not ignore this question. It simply
did not deal with it in a way suggesting that it had received com-
plete and coherent analysis. The approach adopted by the ABA
Commission seems to have been to consider submissions made to it
by persons appearing before it, but to produce no published synthe-
sis of those submissions, and to refrain from announcing the norms
and procedures it used in evaluating the submissions and reaching
its conclusions.
The gap in this process was the absence of any published analy-
sis connecting the submissions generated outside the ABA Commis-
sion with the conclusions reached within it. Thus, the various ways
and contexts in which economic control by nonlawyers might im-
disciplinary Practice in the Law Governing Lawyers, 3, 352-53 (April 2000),
available at http://www.nysba.orgtwhatsnew/maccrate.pdf); Annual Meeting
Transcript, supra note 1.
9. The Big Five are Arthur Andersen, Deloitte Touche Tohnatsu, Ernst &
Young, KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers.
10. See John Gibeaut, Cash Boughs, A.BJ.A J., Feb. 2001, at 50.
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pinge on the professional conduct of lawyers and on the legal system
itself (although covered in some of the submissions received by the
ABA Commission) went essentially unexamined in the Reports and
Recommendations produced by the ABA Commission. Most impor-
tantly, the ABA Commission made no effort to deal with the differ-
ence between the two types of MDP mentioned above, that is, be-
tween an MDP sponsored by an economically dominant nonlegal
entity, on the one hand, and, on the other, MDPs in which legal pro-
fessionals would be likely to exercise economic control or ultimate
economic influence in managing legal practice by the MDP.
This analytical gap produced discontinuity between the ABA
Commission's conclusion and its recommendations. In essence, it
concluded that "an MDP that was not controlled by lawyers might, if
left to its own devices, be less likely than a law firm to create a firm
'culture' that was supportive of strict observance of the rules of pro-
fessional conduct."" Thus stated, the problem was how to assure, in
an MDP controlled by nonlawyers, strict observance of the rules of
professional conduct applicable to legal practice by the MDP. In
1999 (as mentioned above), the ABA Commission proposed that such
an MDP would certify annually to a court that it had complied with
those rules, and would be subject to "administrative audit" by the
court. 2 This recommendation failed to receive support and was
withdrawn by the ABA Commission in 2000.13 It then failed to come
up with any specific recommendation for solving the problem inher-
ent in its own conclusion.
The problem inherent in the conclusion of the ABA Commission
may lie in the duality of its objectives. First, it insisted on author-
izing MDP in what might be called its ultimate form (that is, as
mentioned above, MDPs in which legal practice is effectively con-
trolled by economically dominant nonlegal entities). Second, it as-
pired to strict observance of the rules of professional conduct appli-
cable to legal practice. The failure of the ABA Commission to come
up with a specific recommendation in 2000 may simply reflect its
failure to resolve the contradictory nature of its dual objective. This
in turn may have resulted from divided views within the ABA
Commission as to policy and strategy. In any event, it has been dis-
charged from the task of filling the analytical gap that it confronted
and in significant part created, and the quest for adequate analysis
has turned elsewhere.
11. This succinct and instructive statement of the conclusion of the ABA
Commission on this key point was published by a member of the ABA Commis-
sion, Steven C. Nelson, in The Report and Recommendation of the ABA Com.
mission on Multidisciplinary Practice, INT'L L. NEWS, Section of International
Law and Practice, ABA, Vol. 28, No. 3, Summer 1999.
12. MDP Recommendation, supra note 2.
13. See Annual Meeting Transcript, supra note 1.
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THE AIERICAN LAW AND ECONOMICS SCHOOL
The analysis of 1DP put forward by the American law and eco-
nomics school, briefly stated, is that the availability of legal services
to consumers should be dictated by the marketplace, unrestricted by
barriers in the form of rules governing the legal profession. Those
rules are viewed as "no different from [those of] any other trade un-
ion or interest group pursuing economic protectionism."" Advocates
of those rules are said to be "lawyers defending their economic
There is a certain intellectual purity to this school of thought.
It holds that the ownership of legal practice should be viewed pri-
marily as a function of economic determinism. Thus, whenever legal
practitioners or public authorities adopt regulatory measures relat-
ing to the practice of law, they should subordinate those measures to
the principle of free movement of capital into the practice of law.
Legal practitioners faced with a competitive marketplace "should ei-
ther adapt or go out of business."16
It should be noted that the law and economics school is quite
selective in its choice of the economic consideration that is of pri-
mary significance in the marketplace for professional legal services.
The paramount economic consideration (according to this school) is
freedom of ownership and investment, uncomplicated by any consid-
eration of how this freedom may produce different professional-
service consequences in different economic contexts. In particular,
this school is indifferent to potential variation in professional-
service consequences flowing from the economics of ownership when
legal practices are owned, variously, by (a) lawyers, or (b) conglom-
erate professional enterprises controlled by nonlawyers, or (c) non-
professional investors. As far as the law and economics school is
concerned, possible variation in legal product in different economic
contexts is of less importance than is ownership of the means of pro-
duction of that product. This approach is hardly consumer-oriented.
The consumer seeks the product, not the adoption of a particular
business form by the producer of the product.
This preoccupation with business form may account for, or may
result from, the singular meaning given to "multidisciplinary prac-
tice" by (among others) the law and economics school. The term has
14. Daniel R. Fischel, Multidisciplinary Practice, 55 BUS. LAIw. 951, 974
(2000); see also Daniel R. Fischel, Paper for Seminar in Law and Economics,
Harvard Law School, March 21, 2000.
15. ABA Comm'n on Multidisciplinary Practice, Written Testimony of
James C. Turner, Executive Director of HALT, Inc. (Feb. 5, 1999), available at
http'J/www.halt.orgfFLIP/mdp-ABA.html; see also Tunku Varadarajan, Why is
the ABA Afraid of a Little Competition for Lawyers?, WALL ST. J., July 24, 2000,
at A27 (discussing the view that protectionism motivates the legal profession in
its reaction to MDP).
16. Fischel, Multidisciplinary Practice, supra note 14, at 972-73.
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been transformed into a featureless acronym, "MDP," and the acro-
nym, masterfully marketed, has come to signify a business entity
rather than the concept of "multidisciplinary practice" in the sense
of professionals harmonizing the practice of their disciplines for the
benefit of a common client. Not only marketeers but also legal aca-
demicians, sometimes without pausing to acknowledge the trans-
formation, have used "MDP" to mean not the multidisciplinary
work-product of professionals who coordinate the provision of serv-
ices to common clients, but a business entity which, among other
pursuits, derives economic rent from the practice of law.17
To the potential detriment of the consumer of legal and other
professional services, "MDP" has thus come to mean not the services
but a form of business entity owning or otherwise controlling the
means of production for those services. Having deftly used "MDP" to
mean a particular form of entity, as to which the consumer should
be indifferent, rather than the services in which the consumer has a
legitimate interest, the law and economics school has put itself in a
position to talk about the entity as though it were talking about the
services, and then to focus on assuring that that form of entity has
access to the marketplace. Substantially unexamined by the law
and economics school is the question of whether the services in
which the consumer has a legitimate interest can be made freely
and competitively available in the marketplace without imposing a
particular form of business entity upon the legal system.18
Strictly speaking, the law and economics school is not concerned
with "multidisciplinary practice" in the sense of the actual avail-
ability to consumers of efficiently coordinated and properly rendered
professional services. Rather, that school is concerned with the
ownership of legal practice in any context, be it unidisciplinary (a
conventional stand-alone legal practice), or multidisciplinary (a legal
practice integrated with other professional disciplines), or polycom-
mercial (a legal practice integrated with other business pursuits).
The premise of freedom of ownership of legal practice in any of these
contexts is that the market will determine, efficiently and appropri-
ately, which form of ownership is to be rewarded by consumers pur-
chasing legal services. In order for the market to perform this func-
tion, consumers of legal services, it is argued, must be free to
acquire them from legal practices owned in those forms that the
market elects to reward. The law and economics school does not
permit itself to entertain the possibility that there may be a disjunc-
17. For an example of this transformation by legal academicians, see
Dzienkowski & Peroni, Multidisciplinary Practice and the American Legal Pro.
fession: A Market Approach to Regulating the Delivery of Legal Services in the
Twenty-First Century, 69 FoRDHAM L. REv. 83, 84 n.8 (2000).
18. See Lawrence J. Fox, Dan[iel R. Fischel)'s World: A Free Enterprise
Dream; An Ethics Nightmare, 55 Bus. LAW. 1533 (2000) (although this line of
analysis is not found as such in this article, it would seem to underlie it).
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tion between providing the consumer with services in the best man-
ner consonant with the public interest, and marketing various forms
of ownership of legal practice.
The law and economics school, being essentially unconcerned
with "multidisciplinary practice" in the sense of professional prac-
tice, would permit nonprofessional investors to become owners of le-
gal practices.' Thus, it would carry the concept of integration be-
yond the type of integrated MDP proposed by the ABA Commission
in its 1999 and 2000 reports, and would permit passive portfolio in-
vestors, as well as nonprofessional business or commercial enter-
prises, to own or invest in the practice of law. (The ABA Commis-
sion stated that it was opposed to nonprofessional ownership of, or
passive investment in, legal practice!) Were the views of the law
and economics school to be adopted, banks, insurance companies, re-
tail enterprises, travel agencies, and business conglomerates, among
others, could acquire law firms; and law firms themselves would be
free to issue their own equity securities to outside investors through
private placements or public offerings.
The potential reach of law and economics thinking is thus quite
extensive. To realize its potential, this school of thought would not
encumber itself unduly with questions of reconciling nonlawyer con-
trol of legal practice with legal rules of professional ethics. It is (as
mentioned above) a philosophy of considerable intellectual purity,
ordaining that professional rules must simply give way whenever
their enforcement would impinge upon the mobility of capital in-
vestment in the practice of law. It seems safe to observe that at-
taining this level of purity in practice-transforming law and eco-
nomics theory into a matrix of legal practice-would require
substantial modification of existing rules governing the practice of
law.
THE BIG FIVE AND LAW AND ECONOMICS DOCTRINE
The views of the Big Five on MDP are a subset of law and eco-
nomics doctrine-a subset tailored, quite understandably, to their
19. A seminal work in this respect is Edward S. Adams & John H. Mathe-
son, Law Firms on the Big Board?: A Proposal for Nonlawyer Investment in Law
Firms, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1998). See also Fischel, Multidisciplinary Practice,
supra note 14, at 968 (stating law firms should not be precluded from raising
outside equity capital; if "lawyers would be accountable to shareholders whose
principal concern is on maximizing return on their investment rather than pre-
serving lawyers' independence... so what?").
20. ABA Comm'n on Multidisciplinary Practice, Report to the House of
Delegates (Aug. 1999), available at http:I/www.abanetorg/
cpr/mdprecommendation.htmL For a study of MDP reaching the opposite con-
clusion and recommending passive investment in law firms in France, see the
Rapport Nallet, Les Rdseaux Pluridisciplinaires et les Professions du Droit, at
118-21 (Paris 1999).
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own business objectives.21 In light of those objectives, the Big Five
do not seem to espouse investment by nonprofessionals in the prac-
tice of law. Rather, their approach seems limited to seeking those
changes in rules of the legal profession necessary to accommodate
the acquisition and control of legal practices by the Big Five them-
selves, that is, by those professions other than law, notably ac-
counting, in which the Big Five now engage or might engage in the
future. On the other hand, it seems clear that the Big Five seek to
own and control legal practices within integrated MDPs in which
nonlawyers would have, and lawyers would not have, a preponder-
ant economic interest and ultimate decision-making authority.
Thus, a major objective of the Big Five is to modify or eliminate, as
necessary, professional rules that inhibit or prohibit nonlawyers
from owning, investing in, or controlling legal practices-that is, to
change those rules in a manner that would permit nonlegal profes-
sionals and nonlegal professional entities to own, invest in, and con-
trol firms engaged in the practice of law, and to create integrated
MDPs subsuming legal practices.
22
Such changes have been resisted by the legal profession in-
cluding (as discussed above) resistance by the ABA House of Dele-
gates, on the ground that they would threaten the core values of the
legal profession.' In the Recommendation adopted by the House on
July 11, 2000, these values included the duty of the lawyer: (a) to
manifest "undivided loyalty to the client"; (b) competently to "exer-
cise independent legal judgment for the benefit of the client"; (c) to
"hold client confidences inviolate"; (d) to "avoid conflicts of interest
with the client"; and (e) to "help maintain a single profession of law
with responsibilities as a representative of clients, an officer of the
legal system, and a public citizen having special responsibility for
the quality of justice."
The Big Five (apart from occasionally suggesting, along with the
21. Sources used in arriving at the views of the Big Five on MDP include:
testimony before the ABA Commission, particularly ABA Comm'n on Multidis-
ciplinary Practice, Oral Remarks of Kathryn A. Oberly Vice Chair and General
Counsel, Ernst & Young LLP (Feb. 4, 1999), available at http'//www.abanet.org/
cpr/oberly2.html; the July 1999 statement of the Big Five on the 1999 Report of
the ABA Commission (entitled, "By Dramatically Expanding the Definition of
the 'Practice of Law,' the MDP Commission Transforms Bar Associations into
Super-Regulators with Vast Control over Industries and Organizations Never
Before Subject to Lawyers' Rules and Bar Discipline"); and Big Five papers is-
sued outside the United States, particularly Juri-Avenir, Rdpondre aux Attentes
du March6: un Plan D'Action Qualitd pour L'Audit en Europe (1996); Juri-
Avenir, L'exercice de la profession d'Avocat en Rdseau Pluridisciplinaire (1998).
22. Two of the Big Five are in litigation with the Netherlands Bar in
Europe over the issue of whether integrated MDPs should be permitted. See
Case C-309/99, 1999 O.J. (299) 15-16. The case is now pending before the
European Court of Justice. See id.
23. See Final Report, supra note 8.
24. MDP Recommendation, supra note 2.
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law and economics school, that the bar's concern for professional
core values is window-dressing for professional protectionism)P have
argued that the duties referred to in the preceding paragraph are
the duties of individual lawyers acting in an individual professional
capacity, and are not duties binding on a Big Five firm, as such,
when it employs lawyers held out to the public as engaging in the
practice of law. This position of the Big Five represents a crucial
point in the American debate over MDP. Were it to be adopted, a
nonlegal entity (such as a Big Five firm) controlling the practice of
law would be exonerated from the professional discipline to which
individual lawyers are held.26
This argument--that only individual lawyers, but not nonlegal
entities controlling legal practices, should be subject to the rules
governing the legal profession-has served to focus attention on two
features of proposals for MDPs owned or otherwise controlled by
nonlawyers. The first is jurisdictional: While legal practitioners are
subject to supervision and discipline by the courts, no mechanism
exists for giving the courts jurisdiction over nonlawyers controlling
legal practices, or even for determining what constitutes such con-
trol. The second is substantive: if, in respect of their control of legal
practices, nonlegal entities were to be subject to professional rules
and discipline, what would be the content of those rules and of
measures relating to their enforcement?
The Big Five have not come forward with suggestions that
would facilitate resolving these issues, other than to suggest a retro-
fitting of legal professional rules in a manner that would permit the
Big Five to divorce nonlegal control of legal practice from profes-
sional responsibility for legal practice. The Big Five are thus them-
selves seen to be engaged in a form of protectionism. Their argu-
ment that only their individual lawyers should be subject to the
rules and discipline of the legal profession is an argument for pro-
tecting themselves against the rules and discipline of the very pro-
fession whose economic benefits they seek. Not the Big Five but in-
dividual lawyers would bear the professional risks involved in
carrying out the business plans of their employers. This could pro-
duce tensions between the nonlawyers with ultimate authority over
a Big Five MIP but no accountability under the rules governing the
legal profession, and the lawyers in a subordinate position within
the MDP responsible for helping to realize those business plans by
offering legal services to the public while charged with respecting
25. See supra notes 14 and 15.
26. In New York, not only lawyers, but also law firms are expressly subject
to professional rules governing the legal profession. See N.Y. CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-104(a) and 5-105(e). On this and related points, see gen-
erally ABA Comm'n on Multidisciplinary Practice, Oral Testimony of Professor
Bernard Wolfinan, Harvard Law School (Mar. 12, 1999), available at
http-//www.abanet.org/cpr/wolfnan2.html.
2001]
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
the rules of their profession applicable to such services.
These potential tensions have been most apparent in the debate
over whether legal professional rules on conflicts of interest would
apply throughout an integrated Big Five MDP offering legal services
to the public. The Big Five argue that they should not be subject to
legal conflicts rules, and should be permitted to handle conflicting
assignments by using internal devices known as "screens" or "Chi-
nese Walls" that would separate a firm's professionals handling one
client's problems from that firm's professionals handling the prob-
lems of a client with interests conflicting with those of the first cli-
ent. This argument has met with considerable skepticism by legal
commentators, who can point to contemporaneous court decisions
rejecting as ethically inadequate such internal screening by the Big
Five.27
One commentator has suggested that the type of legal practice
being sought by the Big Five could be accommodated by creating a
two-tier legal profession.' Legal practices fully subject to the rules
governing the practice of law would in effect constitute a separate
profession, and the only profession entitled to hold itself out as fully
protective of the interests of its clients. MDP legal practices that of-
fered a lesser level of client protection would not be entitled to hold
themselves out as full-fledged members of the legal profession. This
proposal has not found substantial support in the course of the MDP
debate, but provides a striking illustration of the issues raised by
the debate.
THE OPPOSING COUNTERPART TO THE LAw AND ECONOMICS SCHOOL
Bar associations in several U.S. jurisdictions seem prepared to
oppose for the foreseeable future any changes whatsoever in the
rules governing the legal profession if the changes would permit
MDP. In terms of intellectual purity, this approach is the opposing
counterpart to the law and economics school. It sees any involve-
ment of nonlawyers in the practice of law as a threat to the core val-
ues of the legal profession (as outlined in Report 10F adopted, as
27. See, e.g., Prince Jefri Bolkiah v. KPMG, 2 App. Cas. 222 (1998) (U.K.
House of Lords). A more recent case in which Ernst & Young's French law firm
found itself on both sides of a case and faced disqualification by a U.S. federal
court is discussed in Sheryl Stratton, Experts from E&Y's French Law Firm
Land on Both Sides of IBM Litigation, 88 TAx NOTEs 611-16 (2000). Senior staff
members of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") have also
taken a position inconsistent with Big Five views on conflicts of interest. See
ABA Comm'n on Multidisciplinary Practice, Reply of the SEC to the MDP Re-
port (July 1999), available at http'//www.abanet.org/cpr/goldschmid.html (letter
to the President of the ABA from the General Counsel, Chief Accountant, and
the Director of Enforcement of the SEC, July 12, 1999); see also Auditory Dis-
comfort, ECONOMIST, Jan. 15, 2000, at 78.
28. Statement of L. Harold Levinson to the New York State Bar Associa-
tion, May 13, 1999.
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discussed above, on July 11, 2000 by the ABA House of Delegates),
that is, as a threat which, if realized, would bring about a substan-
tial erosion of those values.
Pure negativism is often too simplistic to be maintained in the
face of the realities of legal practice. One of these realities is that
lawyers, in order to practice law, often need to engage the profes-
sional or other services of nonlawyers-services of various types
subsumed in the debate over MDP. It is not uncommon for lawyers
and law firms to carry out their work with the aid of ancillary ar-
rangements involving such nonlegal services. Many American
states countenance these arrangements, and in some cases have
adopted legal professional rules that permit them.
In addition, such ancillary arrangements not only are often nec-
essary for the effective practice of law, but also can shade into diffi-
cult conceptual areas not readily dealt with through pure negativ-
ism in respect of MDP. An MDP that is effectively the economic
preserve of lawyers is, analytically, not readily distinguished from
the law firm that uses nonlawyer professionals in carrying out its
legal practice. The enforcement of pure negativism, moreover, re-
quires the enforcer to have always at hand a workable and relevant
definition of the practice of law; and such a definition has often
proved elusive.30
NEW YORK
Beginning in June 1999, the New York State Bar Association
("NYSBA") had been concerned about perceived analytical deficien-
cies in the work of the ABA Commission and, in July 1999, the
NYSBA created its own Special Committee on the Law Governing
Firm Structure and Operation (the "NYSBA Committee").V ' In April
2000, the NYSBA Committee issued its Report entitled "Preserving
the Core Values of the Legal Profession: The Place of Multidisciplin-
ary Practice in the Law Governing Lawyers" (the "NYSBA Re-
port") 3
29. See, e.g., PA. RuLEs OF PROFtL CoNDuCT Rule 5.7. See also Gibeaut, su-
pra note 10.
30. See, eg., Washington State Bar Ass'n, Comm. to Define the Practice of
Law, Final Report, (July 13, 1999), available at http://vw.wsba.orgtc/
cdpl/report.html.
31. Report of the New York State Bar Ass'n Special Comm'n on the Law
Governing Firm Structure and Operation, Preserving the Core Values of the
American Legal Profession: The Place of Multidisciplinary Practice in the Law
Governing Lawyers, (Apr. 2000), available at http//vww.nysba.orgtwhatsnew/
maccrate.pdf [hereinafter NYSBA Report]. The NYSBA Committee has 12
members, plus advisors and liaison officials. See id. Robert MacCrate is its
Chair;, the current President-elect of the NYSBA, Steven C. Krane, and the
author are its Vice Chairs; John D. Leubsdorf is its Reporter. See id.
32. The NYSBA Report (388 pages plus appendices) is obtainable from the
NYSBA, One Elk Street, Albany, N.Y. 12207 ((518) 463-3200; fax (518) 487-
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As the title of the NYSBA Report suggests, it approaches MDP
from the point of view of the law governing lawyers in the United
States-not only statutes and professional rules, but also the con-
siderable body of judge-made law constituting much of the common
law of legal practice. Its announced purpose is to present a study of
the factual predicates of the MDP debate, and to make specific rec-
ommendations as to what should and should not be changed in the
law governing lawyers in order, in the public interest, to clarify the
place of MDP in that law while, at the same time, preserving the
core values of the legal profession.
The NYSBA Report considers ownership of legal practice to con-
stitute control of legal practice and recommends that MDP not be
permitted in a form in which nonlawyers would have ownership or
investment interests.33  The form of MDP recommended by the
NYSBA Report (in addition to lawyer ownership of services ancillary
to the practice of law) is a so-called "side-by-side" affiliation. This
(as set out in the NYSBA Report) is an affiliation in which a law
firm and a nonlegal professional-service firm enter into and main-
tain a contractual relationship for the purpose of offering to the
public, on a systematic and continuing basis, both legal services per-
formed by the law firm, and other professional services. The
NYSBA Report makes it clear, however, that, in such an affiliation
between a law firm and a nonlegal professional-service firm, the lat-
ter should not be permitted to play a role in deciding whether to
provide legal services in a particular matter or to a particular client,
or in determining the manner in which lawyers are hired or trained,
or relating to pro bono publico and other public-interest legal work,
or in financial decision-making relating to legal practice, or in de-
termining the compensation or advancement of lawyers."
The NYSBA Report clearly played a positive role in the delib-
erations of the ABA House of Delegates leading up to the adoption,
on July 11, 2000, of a Recommendation by the House consonant with
the NYSBA Report, and the simultaneous termination of the ABA
Commission by the House. 3 The NYSBA Report filled the analytical
vacuum created by the work of the ABA Commission in 1999 and
5699; available at httpJ/www.nysba.org).
33. Nonlawyers and nonlegal professional service firms affiliated with law-
yers and law firms would not be permitted "to obtain, hold or exercise, directly
or indirectly, any ownership or investment interest in, or managerial or super-
visory right, power or position in connection with, the practice of law by the
lawyer or law firm." The term "ownership or investment interest" is defined to
include "any form of debt or equity". N.Y. RULEs OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY,
Proposed DR 1-107(A)(2), (B)(2), at 352-53.
34. See id., Proposed DR 1-106, at 336-37.
35. See id., at Ch. 12 and appendices for its discussion of its recommenda-
tions (with texts).
36. See supra note 8.
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2000, and in particular was responsive to the call by the ABA House
of Delegates, on August 10, 1999, for "additional study" of the issues
relating to MDP."' Moreover, the NYSBA Report, completed in April
and distributed in early May 2000, was available to members of the
ABA House of Delegates preparing to consider MDP on July 11,
2000 (as discussed above). Accordingly, both the content and the
timing of the NYSBA Report contributed to the positive role that it
played in the mid-2000 U.S. debate on MDP.
One topic covered by the NYSBA Report would seem to merit
comment in explaining the role it played in the mid-2000 debate. In
contrast to the ABA Commission, the NYSBA Report challenged the
nature of MDP being promoted by the Big Five. According to the
NYSBA Report, a Big Five MDP resembles not so much profession-
als from different professions working closely together and guided
by enforceable codes of conduct, as it resembles virtually unregu-
lated services offered by giant business conglomerates which, as re-
gards the lawyers in their employ, tend to be indifferent to their ac-
tual status in the legal profession.' A conclusion that can be
reached from this analysis is that the Big Five may indeed offer, or
seek to offer, the coordinated services of more than one profession,
but they are also interested in acquiring ownership and control of
the unidisciplinary practice of law for its own sake, and they pursue
this interest in a manner that raises serious questions relating to
the title topics of the NYSBA Report: the core values of the Ameri-
37. MDP Recommendation, supra note 2. Reacting to the 1999 Report of
the ABA Commission, the ABA House of Delegates so resolved by a vote of 304
to 98. The additional study supplied by the NYSBA Report consists of six chap-
ters (122 pages) of appraisal of the American legal profession, four chapters
(165 pages) on the challenges to maintaining a single public profession of law,
including a survey of MDP in 12 countries outside the United States (106
pages), and two chapters (73 pages plus appendices) of analysis of the principal
issues together with specific recommendations.
38. The timing was in fact determined by the ABA, which fixed an April 25,
2000 deadline for submissions to be considered by the House of Delegates in
July. The NYSBA Committee met this deadline. (The ABA Commission issued
its Report and Recommendation on May 12, 2000.) The Executive Committee
and the House of Delegates of the NYSBA endorsed the NYSBA Report on, re-
spectively, April 28, 2000 and June 24, 2000.
39. See NYSBA Report, supra note 32 at 152-53, 169-76. The report men-
tions the claim by Ernst & Young that its U.S. affiliated law firm is separate
from Ernst & Young itself. Id at 369. In this connection, compare ERNST &
YOUNG, 2000 WORWIDE CORPORATE TAX GUIDE, Preface and pp. 696-97 (listing
the law firm of McKee Nelson, Ernst & Young LLP of Washington, D.C. as a
member of Ernst & Young International). It should be noted that an affiliate
law firm of the Toronto law firm, Donahue Ernst & Young, has opened an office
in New York "to provide foreign legal services in the U.S." The New York affili-
ate law firm is called Donahue & Partners, is located at the same New York ad-
dress as Ernst & Young, and distributes materials using the Ernst & Young
trade name. A Canadian lawyer with Donahue Ernst & Young, Toronto, was
licensed as a legal consultant in New York in January 2000.
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can legal profession; and the place of MDP in the law governing
lawyers. The NYSBA Report thus provided substantive analysis for
those participants in the mid-2000 debate who were inclined neither
to accept nor to let pass in silence claims being made in respect of
MDP as promoted by the Big Five.
This analysis constitutes an implicit rejection of the tenets of
the law and economics school discussed above. It particularly re-
jects the viewpoint that MDP" signifies a form of business entity,
rather than "multidisciplinary practice" seen as professional serv-
ices made available to consumers. Focusing on the services, not the
business entity, the NYSBA Report concludes with specific recom-
mendations designed to permit law firms and nonlegal professional
service firms to form contractual relationships pursuant to which le-
gal and other professional services are offered to the public." Under
these recommendations, the contracting firms are given substantial
flexibility and latitude to determine the form, nature and content of
their MDP relationship, provided three conditions are met: lawyers
must own and control the legal practice; the nonlegal firm must
meet recognized professional standards; when relevant, the exis-
tence of the relationship must be revealed to clients.41
The specific recommendations of the NYSBA Report (contained
in its appendices) include two proposed new disciplinary rules, one
on the conduct of ancillary businesses by lawyers and law firms, the
other on "side-by-side" contractual relationships between law firms
and nonlegal professional service firms, together with related com-
mentary on these rules, and certain changes to existing rules to con-
form them with the two proposed new rules. Following publication
of the NYSBA Report, the NYSBA Committee received comments
some of which were reflected in new texts of the recommendations
that were submitted to the NYSBA House of Delegates and ap-
proved by it on November 4, 2000. The Appellate Division of the
New York Supreme Court has these recommendations under consid-
eration for possible adoption and incorporation into New York's
Code of Professional Responsibility. The texts are appended hereto
in Code form as Appendix A, and in Model Rule form as Appendix B.
NORTH CAROLINA
The North Carolina Bar Association established a Multidisci-
plinary Practice Task Force which, on September 13, 2000, submit-
ted a Report (the "NCBA Report") to the Association's Board of Gov-
ernors for its consideration. The NCBA Report recommends the
inclusion of two new rules in the North Carolina Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct. One of the proposed new rules, Rule 5.7, is on an-
40. See N.Y. RULES OF PROF'L RESPONSMITY, Proposed DR 1-107(A) in




cillary services; the other, Rule 5.8, is on contractual relationships
between lawyers and nonlegal professionals.!2 The two proposed
new rules, as included in the NCBA Report, are closely patterned af-
ter the two new disciplinary rules recommended in the April 2000
NYSBA Report, discussed above.
43
The NCBA Report also contains a proposal not found in the
NYSBA Report. In addition to permitting contractual relationships
between lawyers and nonlegal professionals, it would permit what
the NCBA Report calls a "modified command and control model" of
MDP.4 The NCBA Report does not include a proposed new rule to
this end, but does contain a draft resolution for consideration by the
Association's Board of Governors which, in significant part, reads as
follows:
Lawyers should be permitted to share fees and join with non-
lawyer professionals in an entity that delivers both legal and
nonlegal professional services provided that the lawyers (who
practice law) have the control and authority over the entity
necessary to assure lawyer independence in the rendering of
legal services, which control must represent at least a 51%
controlling interest, in law and in fact, in the entity. "Nonlaw-
yer professionals" means members of recognized professions or
other disciplines that are governed by ethical standards. Spe-
cifically, lawyers (who practice law) may form a partnership
with a nonlawyer and share legal fees subject to certain clearly
defined restrictions. The nonlawyer professionals must agree
"to abide by the rules of professional conduct" and the lawyers
with a financial interest or managerial authority must "under-
take to be responsible for the nonlawyer participants to the
same extent as if nonlawyer participants were lawyers under
Rule 5.1." A significant purpose of the entity must be the pro-
vision of legal services.4
Although the language just quoted is not cast in terms of pre-
sumptions, it seems to raise a rebuttable presumption that, so long
as nonlawyers do not own more than 49% of the entity, it should be
deemed to be controlled "in law and in fact" by lawyers. If that in-
terpretation is correct, then a party contesting compliance (e.g., a
client or disciplinary body) would have the burden of establishing
that lawyers did not "in fact" control an entity 51% of which was
owned by lawyers and 49% of which was owned by nonlawyers. If
42. North Carolina Bar Ass'n, Report to North Carolina Bar Ass'n Board of
Governors by North Carolina Bar Ass'n Multidisciplinary Practice Task Force,
(Sept. 13, 2000) [hereinafter NCBA Report].
43. See the text beginning at note 46, infra, for issues as to which the
NCBA Report differs from New Yorlks recommendations in respect of proposed
Rule 5.8. The New York draft of Rule 5.8 is in Appendix B.
44. See NCBA Report, supra note 42, at 2.
45. Id. at 2-3.
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the 49% owned by nonlawyers were concentrated in the hands of a
few individuals associated with and designated by a firm with sub-
stantial economic resources, and if the 51% owned by lawyers were
held in small lots by individuals with more modest economic re-
sources, would the burden then shift on the issue of control "in fact"?
If so, at what point, in terms of measuring the disparity between
relative economic resources and relative concentration of ownership,
would the burden shift? Suppose the entity was managed by an ex-
ecutive committee on which the lawyers outnumbered the nonlaw-
yers by a majority of one, and suppose the managing partner and
head of finance were nonlawyers, how would one go about resolving
the issue of control "in fact"?
In a rather basic sense, the burden of proof would always be on
the lawyers in the entity, because only they would be subject to the
Rules of Professional Conduct (a draft of which does not yet exist)
adopted to implement this proposed resolution. Presumably, the
burden would be on-going as the entity evolved over the years, and
the issue of factual control could in theory be raised from time to
time on the basis of current actual circumstances. Were a violation
of the control rule to be established, the lawyers might be subject to
discipline. It seems unlikely, however, that a case would arise solely
over an alleged violation of the requirement of lawyer control, and
that, more likely, the control rule would be invoked (if at all) only
when a case arose involving some other issue, such as conflict of in-
terest. Then, even if the nonlawyers were relevant to the alleged
conflict of interest, only the lawyers would be at risk under the con-
trol rule for having failed to maintain control "in fact."
Another factor of potential relevance is the trade name used by
the entity. Let us suppose that a law firm, itself named for individ-
ual lawyers, used not only the firm name but also the valuable trade
name of a nonlegal entity of substantial economic strength whose
designees owned 49% of the law firm. Almost certainly the nonlegal
entity would insist on entering into a license agreement setting out
the terms on which its valuable trade name could be used by the law
firm. Should those terms be taken into account in assessing
whether the lawyers "in fact" control the law firm? One term of the
license would probably give the nonlegal entity the right to cancel
the license; and potential influence over the law firm might well flow
from this right. Should this right of the licensor (the nonlegal en-
tity) be taken into account in judging whether the licensee (the law
firm) is "in fact" controlled by lawyers? If so, how much weight
should be given to a revocable trade-name license? Might it, even in
an entity majority-owned by lawyers, place the lawyers in a subor-
dinate position not unlike that of a commercial franchisee?
Here, there is a difference in approach between the commentary
found in the NCBA Report and the corresponding commentary
found in respect of the rules proposed in New York. As regards "in-
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terprofessional contractual arrangements"-meaning the "side-by-
side" arrangements advocated by both the NCBA Report and the
NYSBA Report-the NCBA Report has this to say:
A typical contract [between a law firm and a nonlegal profes-
sional services firm] might include terms such as (1) the law
firm agreeing to identify its affiliation with the professional
services firm on its letterhead and business cards, and in its
advertising; (2) the law firm and the professional services firm
agreeing to refer clients to each other on a nonexclusive basis;
and (3) the law firm agreeing to purchase goods and services
from the professional services firm such as staff management,
communications technology, and rent for the leasing of office
space and equipment.
4 6
On the second point (referrals), the New York and North Caro-
lina positions are quite similar, but on the first and third points,
their respective approaches are somewhat different. As regards use
by the law firm of the trade name of the nonlegal firm, relevant New
York commentary reads as follows:
[A] lawyer or law firm may not enter into an agreement or ar-
rangement for the use of a name in respect of which a nonlegal
professional or nonlegal professional service firm has or exer-
cises a proprietary interest if, under or pursuant to this
agreement or arrangement, that nonlegal professional or firm
acts or is entitled to act in a manner inconsistent with DR 1-
107(A)(2) [Rule 5.8(a)(2)] or EC 1-13 [related Comment[1]] [the
rule and related commentary prohibiting a nonlegal firm from
owning or otherwise controlling a law firm].47
Thus, New York would take precautions to try to assure that, by
virtue of a trade-name license, the law firm was not treated as a
franchisee of the nonlegal firm in a manner permitting the latter to
exercise "any managerial or supervisory right, power or position in
connection with the practice of law by the law firm."
On the third point in the language from the NCBA Report
quoted above (relating to purchases of goods and services by the law
firm from the nonlegal firm), New York would permit an allocation
of costs and expenses between the two firms "provided the allocation
reasonably reflects the costs and expenses incurred or expected to be
incurred by each [firm]"; and would permit "the sharing of premises,
general overhead, or administrative costs and services on an arm's
46. Id. at 2.
47. Resolution Adopted by New York State Bar Association House of Dele-
gates (Nov. 4, 2000) N.Y. RULES OF PROf'L RESPONSBmLTY EC 1-14 in App. A
[hereinafter NYSBA Resolution].
48. The quoted language is in Rule 5.8(a)(2) as proposed by both the NCBA
Report, supra note 43, and the NYSBA Report, supra note 32.
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length basis."49 The corresponding provision in the NCBA Report
does not contain any language requiring that the allocation be on an
arm's-length basis, or that the allocation otherwise reasonably re-
flect the respective costs and expenses of the legal and nonlegal
firms in question. The third point in the NCBA Report may, there-
fore, provide further opportunities for the nonlegal firm to treat the
law firm as a franchisee, paying the franchisor other than on a cost-
reimbursement basis for such items as management assistance,
technology, and office space.
CONCLUSION
Both New York (in the NYSBA Report and proposed rules now
pending before the New York courts) and North Carolina (in the re-
port now pending before the North Carolina Bar Association) have
attempted to fill the analytical gap left by the reports of the ABA
Commission. Both the New York and North Carolina reports reject
the extreme positions of, on the one hand, the law and economics
school espousing MDP in any form, and, on the other hand, those
states that oppose MDP in any form. Both of these state reports
have concluded that, in the public interest, the core values of the le-
gal profession should be preserved and that this objective can be
achieved only if lawyers own and otherwise control the practice of
law.
Differences arise, however, in certain areas. Regarding "side-
by-side" contractual relationships between law firms and nonlegal
firms for the offering of legal and other professional services to the
public, the New York report is cautionary in the areas of trade-name
agreements and expense-allocation agreements. These are areas in
which the New York report is wary of the risk that law firms might
become, expressly or subtly, the quasi-franchisees of nonlegal firms
pursuant to arrangements granting to the latter a degree of control
over the practice of law. In contrast, at the risk of thus conferring
on nonlegal firms a degree of control over the practice of law, the
North Carolina report almost seems to encourage quasi-franchise
arrangements between law firms and nonlegal firms involving
trade-names licensed by, and goods and services supplied by, the
latter to the former.
A potentially greater difference is that the North Carolina re-
port, while patterned after the New York report regarding both an-
cillary nonlegal services offered by law firms and "side-by-side" con-
tractual arrangements as mentioned above, would also provide for a
"modified command and control model" of multidisciplinary practice.
This would be a form of MDP that was majority-owned by lawyers.
The North Carolina report discusses and recommends, but does not
49. NYSBA Resolution, supra note 47, at DR 1-107(D), EC 1-14 in App. A
and related Comment [2] in App. B.
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go so far as to formulate a rule that would define and delimit, this
form of MDP. Such a rule will not draft itself and, indeed, will bring
the people drafting it face to face with issues inherent in but un-
solved by the 1999 and 2000 Reports of the ABA Commission. Not
inconceivably, the North Carolina report has reached the point be-
yond which the ABA Commission was unable to proceed, and has
thereby brought the MDP debate full circle.
As has been seen in the context of the Big Five, much of the
MDP debate revolves around ownership and control of the unidisci-
plinary practice of law-practice, that is, to which nonlegal entities
may aspire in part because the practice of law is thought to be prof-
itable. These nonlegal entities may tend to underestimate the
problems involved in transforming into profits the complexities and
exigencies of legal practice. Be that as it may, the role of nonlegal
entities in the practice of law raises questions as to applicable pro-
fessional rules. Among other common aspects of the New York and
North Carolina reports is that they look for answers to those ques-
tions in the law governing lawyers in the United States.
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APPENDIX A
RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE
NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
HOUSE OF DELEGATES
NOVEMBER 4,2000
WHEREAS, the New York State Bar Association ("NYSBA") has adopted
the Code of Professional Responsibility ("Code"); and
WHEREAS, the Disciplinary Rules of the Code have been expressly incor-
porated into Rules of Court by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court
("Appellate Division") in each of the four Judicial Departments in New York
State; and
WHEREAS, pursuant to a scheduling resolution adopted on this date,
amendments to the Code have been proposed following review by the Special
Committee on the Law Governing Firm Structure and Operation, county and
local bar associations, interested sections and committees of the NYSBA and
other interested organizations; it is
RESOLVED, that the House of Delegates of the NYSBA hereby approves
the Code as amended by this House, contingent upon adoption by the Appellate
Division of the Disciplinary Rules therein contained; and it is further
RESOLVED, that the Special Committee on the Law Governing Firm
Structure and Operation is hereby authorized to make such non-substantive,
stylistic changes as might be necessary to ensure uniformity of language and
format throughout the Code; and it is further
RESOLVED, that the officers of the Association are hereby empowered
and directed to transmit the Code as amended to the Appellate Division and to
take such other and further action as may be required or deemed appropriate to
achieve the implementation of the recommended Code amendments.
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PROPOSED AhENDMENTS To THE
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Additions to current Code indicated by underscorin.
Deletions from current Code indicated by <sftikeb h.
CANON 1
DISCIPLINARY RULES
DR 1-106 Responsibilities Regarding Nonleal Services
A. With respect to lawyers or law firms providing nonlegal services to
clients or other persons:
1. A lawyer or law firm that provides nonlegal services to a person that
are not distinct from legal services being provided to that-person by the la7yer
or law firm is subiect to these Disciplinary Rules with respect to the provision of
both legal and nonlegal services.
2. A lawyer or law firm that provides nonleeal services to a person that
are distinct from legal services being provided to that person by the lawyer or
law firm is subject to these Disciplinary Rules with respect to the nonlecal
services if the person receiving the services could reasonably believe that the
nonlegal services are the subject of an attorney-client relationship.
3. A lawyer or law firm that is an owner. controlling-party or agent of,
or that is otherwise affiliated with, an entity that the lawyer or law firm kmows
to be providing nonlegal services to a person is subject to these Disciplinary
Rules with respect to the nonlegal services if the person receiving the services
could reasonably believe that the nonlegal services are the subiect of an attor-
ney-client relationship.
4. For purposes of DR 1-106(A)(2) and DR 1-106(A)(3). it will be pre-
sumed that the person receiving nonlegal services could not reasonably believe
the services to be the subject of an attorney-client relationship if the lawyer or
law firm has advised the person receiving the services in writing that the serv-
ices are not legal services and that the protection of an attorney-client relation-
ship does not exist with respect to the nonlegal services, or if the interest of the
lawyer or law firm in the entity providing nonlegal services is de minimis.
B. Notwithstanding the provisions of DR 1-106(A). a lawyer or law firm
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that is an owner, controlling party, agent, or is otherwise affiliated with an en-
tity that the lawyer or law firm knows is providing nonlegal services to a person
shall not permit any nonlawer providing such services or affiliated with that
entity to direct or reulate the professional judgment of the lawyer or law firm
in rendering legal services to any person, or to cause the lawyer or law firm to
compromise its duty under DR 4-101(B) and (D) with respect to the confidences
and secrets of a client receiving legal services.
C. For purposes of DR 1-106, "nonlegal services" shall mean those serv-
ices that lawyers may lawfully provide and that are not prohibited as the unau-
thorized practice of law when provided by a nonlawver
DR 1-107 Contractual Relationships Between Lawyers and Nonleaal
Professionals
A. A lawyer or law firm may enter into and maintain a contractual rela-
tionship with a nonlegal professional or nonlegal professional service firm for
the purpose of offering to the public, on a systematic and continuing basis, legal
services performed by the lawyer or law firm, as well as other professional
services, notwithstanding the provisions of DR 5-101(A), provided that:
1. The profession of the nonlegal professional or nonle al professional
service firm is listed by the Office of Court Administration pursuant to DR 1-
107(B):
2. The lawyer or law firm neither grants to the nonlegal professional or
nonlegal professional service firm, nor permits such person or firm to obtain,
hold or exercise, directly or indirectly, any ownership or investment interest in,
or managerial or supervisory right, power or position in connection with, the
practice of law by the lawyer or law firm: and
3. The fact that the contractual relationship exists is disclosed to any
client of the lawyer or law firm to whom nonlegal professional services are pro-
vided.
B. For purposes of DR 1-107(A):
1. Each profession on the list maintained by the Office of Court Ad-
ministration shall have been designated by it sua sponte, or shall have been ap-
proved by it upon the application of an individual or firm in this State, upon.a
determination that the profession is composed of individuals who, with respect
to their profession:
a. have been awarded a Bachelor's Degree or its equivalent from an ac-
credited college or university
b. are licensed to practice the profession by an agency of the State of
New York or the United States Government: and
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c. are required under penalty of suspension or revocation of license to
adhere to a code of ethical conduct that is reasonably comparable to that of the
leaal profession.
2. The term "ownership or investment interest" shall mean any such in-
terest in any form of debt or equity, and shall include any interest commonly
considered to be an interest accruing to or enjoyed by an owner or investor.
C. DR 1-107(A)(1) shall not aplv to relationships consisting solely of
reciprocal referral agreements or understandings between a lawyer or law firm
and a nonlegal professional or nonlegal professional service firm.
D. Notwithstanding DR 3-102(A), a lawyer or law firm may allocate
costs and expenses with a nonlegal professional or nonlegal professional service
firm pursuant to a contractual relationship permitted by DR 1-107(A). provided
the allocation reasonably reflects the costs and expenses incurred or expected to
be incurred by each.
Ethical Considerations
Provision of Nonle,'al Services
EC 1-9 For many years, lawyers have provided nonlegal services to their
clients. By participating in the delivery of these services. lawyers can serve a
broad ranae of economic and other interests of clients. Whenever a lawyer di-
rectly provides nonlegal services, the lawyer must avoid confusion on the part of
the client as to the nature of the lawyer's role, so that the person for whom the
nonlegal services are performed understands that the services may not carrv
with them the legal and ethical protections that ordinarily accompany an attor-
ney-client relationship. The recipient of the nonlegal services may expect, for
example, that the protection of client confidences and secrets, prohibitions
against representation of persons with conflicting interests, and obligations of a
lawyer to maintain professional independence applv to the provision of nonleial
services, when that may not be the case. The risk of confusion is especially
acute when the lawyer renders both legal and nonlegal services with respect to
the same matter. Under some circumstances, the lecal and nonlegal services
may be so closely entwined that they cannot be distinguished from each other.
In this situation, the recipient is likely to be confused as to whether and when
the relationship is protected as a client-lawyer relationship. Therefore, where
the legal and nonlegal services are not distinct, DR 1-106(A)(1) requires that
the lawyer providing nonlegal services adhere to all of the requirements of the
Code of Professional Responsibility with respect to the nonlegal services. DR
1-106(A)(1) applies to the provision of nonlegal services by a lawyer even when
the lawyer is not personally providing any legal servicem to the person for whom
the nonlegal services are being performed if the person is also receivini- lecal
services from another lawyer in the firm that are not distinct from the nonlegal
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EC 1-10 Even when the lawyer believes that the provision of nonlegal
services is distinct from any legal services being provided, there is still a risk
that the recipient of the nonlegal services might reasonably believe that the re-
cipient is receiving the protection of an attorney-client relationship. Therefore,
DR 1-106(A)(2) requires that the lawyer Providing the nonlegal services adhere
to the Disciplinary Rules, unless exempted. Nonlegal services also may be pro-
vided through an entity with which a lawyer is affiliated, for example, as owner,
controlling party or agent. In this situation, there is still a risk that the recipi-
ent of the nonlegal services might reasonably believe that the recipient is re-
ceiving the protection of an attorney-client relationship. Therefore. DR
1-106(A)(3) requires that the lawyer involved with the entity providing nonlegal
services adhere to all the Disciplinary Rules with respect to the nonlegal serv-
ices, unless exempted.
EC 1-11 The Disciplinary Rules will be presumed not to apply to a lawyer
who directly provides or is otherwise involved in the provision of nonlegal serv-
ices if the lawyer complies with DR 1-106(A)(4) by communicating in writing to
the person receiving the nonlegal services that the services are not legal serv-
ices and that the protection of an attorney-client relationship does not exist
with respect to the nonlegal services. Such a communication should be made
before entering into an agreement for the provision of nonlegal services, in .
manner sufficient to assure that the person understands the significance of the
communication. In certain circumstances, however, additional steps may be re-
quired to communicate the desired understanding. For example, while the
written disclaimer set forth in DR 1-106(A)(4) will be adequate for a sophisti-
cated user of legal and nonlegal services, a more detailed explanation may be
required for someone unaccustomed to making distinctions between legal serv-
ices and nonlegal services. The lawyer or law firm will not be required to com-
ply with these requirements if its interest in the entity providing the nonlegal
services is so small as to be de minimus.
EC 1-12 Although a lawyer may be exempt from the application of Disci-
plinary Rules with respect to nonlegal services on the face of DR 1-106(A). the
scope of the exemption is not absolute. A lawyer who provides or who is in-
volved in the provision of nonlegal services may be excused from compliance
with only those Disciplinary Rules that are dependent upon the existence of.a
representation or attorney-client relationship. Other rules, such as those pro-
hibiting lawyers from engaging in illegal, dishonest, fraudulent or deceptive
conduct (DR 1-102), requiring lawyers to report certain attorney misconduct
(DR 1-103), and prohibiting lawyers from misusing the confidences or secrets of
a former client (DR 4-101(B)), apply to a lawyer irrespective of the existence of a
representation, and thus govern a lawyer otherwise exempt under DR 1-106(A)
A lawyer or law firm is always subject to these Disciplinary Rules with respect
to the rendering of legal services.
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Contractual Relationships Between Lawyers and Nonleg-al Professionals
EC 1-13 DR 1-107 permits lawyers to enter into interprofessional contrac-
tual relationships for the systematic and continuing provision of legal and non-
legal professional services provided the nonlegal professional or nonlegal pro-
fessional service firm with which the lawyer or law firm is affiliated does not
own, control, supervise or manage, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, the
practice of law by the lawyer or law firm. The nonleal professional or nonlegal
professional service firm may not Play a role in, for example, the decision
whether to accept or terminate an engagement to provide leal services in a
particular matter or to a particular client, determining the manner in which
lawyers are hired or trained, the assignment of lawyers to handle particular
matters or to provide legal services to particular clients, decisions relating to
the undertaking of pro bono pubice and other public-interest legal work, finan-
cial and budyetary decisions relating to the legal practice, and determining the
compensation and advancement of lawyers and of persons assisting lawyers on
legal matters
EC 1-14 The contractual relationship permitted by DR 1-107 may provide
for the reciprocal referral of clients by and between the lawyer or law firm and
the nonlegal professional or nonlegal professional service firm. It may also pro-
vide for the sharing of premises, general overhead, or administrative costs and
services on an arm's length basis. Such financial arrangements, in the context
of an agreement between lawyers and other professionals to provide lepal and
other professional services on a systematic and continuing basis, are permitted
notwithstanding that they involve the exchange of value for client referrals and,
technically, a sharing of professional fees, matters that are dealt with-specifi-
cally in DR 2-103(B)(1) and DR 1-107(D). Similarly. lawyers participating-in
such arrangements remain subiect to general ethical principles in addition to
those set forth in DR 1-107 includinn. at a minimum, DR 2-102(B), DR 5-105(A),
DR 5-105(B). DR 5-107(B), DR 5-107(C), and DR 5-108(A). Thus, the lawyer or
law firm may not, for example, include in its firm name the name of the nonle-
mal professional service firm or any individual nonlegal professional, or enter
into formal partnerships with nonlawvers, or practice in an or-,onization
authorized to practice law for a profit in which nonlawvers own any interest,
Moreover. a lawyer or law firm may not enter into an agreement or arrange-
ment for the use of a name in respect of which a nonlegal professional or nonle-
gal professional service firm has or exercises a proprietary interest if, under or
pursuant to the areement or arrangement, that nonlegal professional or firm
acts or is entitled to act in a manner inconsistent with DR 1-107(A)(2) or EC 1-
13. More generally, although the existence of a contractual relationship permit-
ted by DR 1-107 does not by itself create a conflict of interest violating DR 5-
101(A) whenever a law firm represents a client in a matter in which the nonle-
gal professional firm's client is also involved, the law firm's interest in main-
taining an advantageous relationship with the nonleal professional service
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firm might, in certain circumstances, adversely affect the independent profes-
sional judgment of the law firm, creating a conflict of interest.
EC 1-15 Each lawyer and law firm having a contractual relationship un-
der DR 1-107 has an ethical duty to observe these Disciplinary Rules with re-
spect to its own conduct in the context of the contractual relationship. For ex-
ample, the lawyer or law firm cannot permit its obligation to maintain client
confidences as required by DR 4-101 to be compromised by the contractual rela-
tionship or by its implementation by or on behalf of nonlawyers involved in the
relationship. In addition, the prohibition in DR 1-102(A)(2) against a lawyer or
law firm circumventing a Disciplinary Rule through actions of another applies
generally to the lawyer or law firm in the contractual relationship.
EC 1-16 When in the context of a contractual relationship permitted un-
der DR 1-107 a lawyer or law firm refers a client to the nonlegal professional or
nonlegal professional service firm, the lawyer or law firm shall observe the ethi-
cal standards of the legal profession in verifying the competence of the nonlegal
professional or nonlegal professional services firm to handle the relevant affairs
and interests of the client. Referrals should only be made when requested by
the client or deemed to be reasonably necessary to serve the client.
EC 1-17 To assure that only appropriate professional services are in-
volved, a contractual relationship for the provision of services is permitted un-
der DR 1-107 only if the nonlegal party thereto is a professional or professional
service firm meeting appropriate standards as regards ethics, education, train-
ing, and licensing. The Office of Court Administration maintains a public list ot
eligible professions. Individuals and firms in this state may apply for the inclu-
sion of particular professions on the list, or professions may be added to the list
by the Office of Court Administration sua sponte. A lawyer or law firm not
wishing to affiliate with a nonlawyer on a systematic and continuing basis, but
only to engage a nonlawyer on an ad hoc basis to assist in a specific matter,. is
not governed by DR 1-107 when so dealing with the nonlawyer. Thus, a lawyer
advising a client in connection with a discharge of chemical wastes may engage
the services of and consult with an environmental engineer on that matter
without the need to comply with DR 1-107. Likewise, the requirements of DR 1-
107 need not be met when a lawyer retains an expert witness in a particular
litigation.
EC 1-18 Depending upon the extent and nature of the relationship be-
tween the lawyer or law firm, on the one hand, and the nonlegal professional or
nonlegal professional service firm, on the other hand, it may be appropriate to
treat the parties to a contractual relationship permitted by DR 1-107 as a single
law firm for purposes of these Disciplinary Rules, as would be the case if the
nonlegal professional or nonlegal professional service firm were in an "of coun-
sel" relationship with the lawyer or law firm. If the parties to the relationship
are treated as a single law firm, the principal effects would be that conflicts ot
interest are imputed as between them pursuant to DR 5-105(D), and that the
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law firm would be required to maintain systems for determining whether such
conflicts exist pursuant to DR 5-105(E). To the extent that the rules of ethics of
the nonlegal profession conflict with these Disciplinary Rules, the rules of the
leaal profession will still govern the conduct of the lawyers and the law firm
participants in the relationship. A lawyer or law firm may also be subject to le-
gal obligations arising from a relationship with nonlawer professionals who
are themselves subiect to regulation.
CANON 2
DiscipLNARY RULES
DR 2-101 Publicity and Advertising.
A. A lawyer on behalf of himself or herself or partners or associates,
shall not use or disseminate or participate in the preparation or dissemination
of any public communication or communication to a prospective client contain-
ing statements or claims that are false, deceptive or misleading.
B. (Repealed)
C. It is proper to include information, provided its dissemination does
not violate the provisions of DR 2-101(A), as to:
1. legal and nonlegal education, degrees and other scholastic distinc-
tions; dates of admission to any bar;, areas of the law in which the lawyer or law
firm practices, as authorized by the Code of Professional Responsibility;, public
offices and teaching positions held; memberships in bar associations or other
professional societies or organizations, including offices and committee assign-
ments therein; foreign language fluency;,
2. names of clients regularly represented, provided that the client has
given prior written consent;
3. bank references; credit arrangements accepted; prepaid or group le-
gal services programs in which the attorney or firm participates; nonlegal serv-
ices provided by the lawyer or by an entity owned and controlled by the lawyer,
the existence of contractual relationships between the lawyer or law firm and a
nonlegal professional or nonlegal professional service firm, to the extent permit-
ted by DR 1-107, and the nature and extent of services available through those
contractual relationships and
4. <legal> fees for initial consultation; contingent fee rates in civil mat-
ters when accompanied by a statement disclosing the information required by
DR 2-101(L) of this section; range of fees for legal and nonleaal services, pro-
vided that there be available to the public free of charge a written statement
2001]
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clearly describing the scope of each advertised service; hourly rates; and fixed
fees for specified legal and nonlegal services.
D. Advertising and publicity shall be designed to educate the public to
an awareness of legal needs and to provide information relevant to the selection
of the most appropriate counsel. Information other than that specifically
authorized in DR 2-101(C) that is consistent with these purposes may be dis-
seminated providing that it does not violate any other provisions of this Rule.
DR 2-102 Professional Notices, Letterheads, and Signs.
A. A lawyer or law firm may use professional cards, professional an-
nouncement cards, office signs, letterheads or similar professional notices or
devices, provided the same do not violate any statute or court rule, and are in
accordance with DR 2-101, including the following-
1. A professional card of a lawyer identifying the lawyer by name and
as a lawyer, and giving addresses, telephone numbers, the name of the law
firm, and any information permitted under DR 2-101(C). DR 2-101(D) or DR 2-
105. A professional card of a law firm may also give the names of members and
associates.
2. A professional announcement card stating new or changed associa-
tions or addresses, change of firm name, or similar matters pertaining to the
professional offices of a lawyer or law firm or of any nonlegal business con-
ducted by the lawyer or law firm pursuant to DR 1-106. It may state biographi-
cal data, the names of members of the firm and associates and the names and
dates of predecessor firms in a continuing line of succession. It may state the
nature of the legal practice if permitted under DR 2-105.
3. A sign in or near the office and in the building directory identifying
the law office and any nonlegal business conducted by the lawyer or law firm
pursuant to DR 1-106. The sign may state the nature of the legal practice if
permitted under DR 2-105.
4. A letterhead identifying the lawyer by name and as a lawyer, and
giving addresses, telephone numbers, the name of the law firm, associates and
any information permitted under DR 2-101(C), DR 2-101(D) or DR 2-105. A let-
terhead of a law firm may also give the names of members and associates, and
names and dates relating to deceased and retired members. A lawyer or law
firm may be designated "Of Counsel" on a letterhead if there is a continuing
relationship with a lawyer or law firm, other than as a partner or associate. A
lawyer or law firm may be designated as "General Counsel" or by similar pro-
fessional reference on stationery of a client if the lawyer or the firm devotes a
substantial amount of professional time in the representation of that client.
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The letterhead of a law firm may give the names and dates of predecessor firms
in a continuing line of succession.
B. A lawyer in private practice shall not practice under a trade name, a
name that is misleading as to the identity of the lawyer or lawyers practicing
under such name, or a firm name containing names other than those of one or
more of the lawyers in the firm, except that the name of a professional corpora-
tion shall contain 'P.C." or such symbols permitted by law, the name of a lim-
ited liability company or partnership shall contain "L.L.C.," "LL.P." or such
symbols permitted by law, and, if otherwise lawful, a firm may use as, or con-
tinue to include in its name the name or names of one or more deceased or re-
tired members of the firm or of a predecessor firm in a continuing line of succes-
sion. Such terms as "legal clinic," "legal aid," "legal service office," "legal
assistance office," "defender office" and the like, may be used only by qualified
legal assistance organizations, except that the term "legal clinic" may be used
by any lawyer or law firm provided the name of a participating lawyer or firm is
incorporated therein. A lawyer or law firm may not include the name of a non-
lawyer in its firm name, nor may a lawyer or law firm that has a contractual
relationship with a nonlegal professional or nonlegal professional service firm
pursuant to DR 1-107 to provide legal and other professional services on a sys-
tematic and continuing basis include in its firm name the name of the nonleal
professional service firm or any individual nonleal professional affiliated
therewith. A lawyer who assumes a judicial, legislative or public executive or
administrative post or office shall not permit his or her name to remain in the
name of a law firm or to be used in professional notices of the firm during any
significant period in which the lawyer is not actively and regularly practicing
law as a member of the firm and, during such period, other members of the firm
shall not use the lawyeres name in the firm name or in professional notices of
the firm.
DR 2-103 Solicitation and Recommendation of Professional Employment
B. A lawyer shall not compensate or give anything of value to a person
or organization to recommend or obtain employment by a client, or as a reward
for having made a recommendation resulting in employment by a client, except
that:
1. A lawyer or law firm may refer clients to a nonlegal professional or
nonlezal professional service firm pursuant to an agreement or other contrac-
tual relationship with such nonlegal professional or nonlegal professional serv-
ice firm to provide legal and other professional services on a systematic and
continuing basis as permitted by DR 1-107: or
2. A <a> lawyer may pay the usual and reasonable fees or dues charged
by a qualified legal assistance organization or referral fees to another lawyer as
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permitted by DR 2-107.
Ethical Considerations
EC 2-10 A lawyer should ensure that the information contained in any ad-
vertising which the lawyer publishes, broadcasts or causes to be published or
broadcast is relevant, is disseminated in an objective and understandable fash-
ion, and would facilitate the prospective cientos ability to select a lawyer. A
lawyer should strive to communicate such information without undue emphasis
upon style and advertising stratagems which serve to hinder rather than to fa-
cilitate intelligent selection of counsel. Although communications involving
puffery and claims that cannot be measured or verified are not specifically re-
ferred to in DR 2-101, such communications would be prohibited to the extent
that they are false, deceptive or misleading. Special care should be taken to
avoid the use of any statement or claim which is false, fraudulent, misleading
deceptive or unfair, or which is violative of any statute or rule of court,.in dis-
closing information, by advertisements or otherwise, relating to a lawyeres le-
gal or nonlegal education, experience or professional qualifications, the nature
or extent of any nonlegal services provided by the lawyer or by an entity owned
and controlled by the lawyer, or the existence of contractual relationships be-
tween the lawyer or law firm and a nonlegal professional or nonlegal profes-
sional service firm, to the extent permitted by DR 1-107, and the nature and ex-
tent of services available through those contractual relationships. A lawyer who
advertises in a state other than New York should comply with the advertising
rules or regulations applicable to lawyers in that state.
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APPENDIX B
CORRESPONDING CHANGES TO THE
ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr
Rule 5.7 Responsibilities Regarding w-Rekted NonlegaZ Seruices
(a) A l.wye ....... e -•es o --f; e 11 Ceon .w th
rs1peet to. the Iso of, la.;-relatted z sJec ~~~ C)
the la ... lated . e, . iee re 1 p-v-.3iJde
(1) by the lawyer i eire e t Und from the .
t...... lai -,ye ffl te thrna le - " "eth.. "obtaining the law-rlaed seves to.jhatth" -jr af s the sepaate At
.. are n l ... *
lients or othe e kierso. a ns: wyerh
cleso r other esons
(1) A lawyer or law firm that provides nonleal services to a person that
are not distinct from legal services bein provided to that person by the lawyer
or law firm is subject to these Rules of Professional Conduct with respect to the
provision of both leral and nonlegal services.
(2) A lawyer or law firm that provides nonleral services to a person that
are distinct from legal services being provided to that person hy the lawyer or
law firm is subject to these Rules of Professional Conduct with respect to the
nonlegal services if the person receiving the services could reasonably believe
that the nonlegal services are the subiect of an attorney-client relationship.
(3) A lawyer or law firm that is an owner, controllinrz Party or arrent of,
or that is otherwise affiliated with, an entity that the lawyer or law firm kmows
is providing nonlegal services to a person is subject to these Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct with respect to the nonlegal services if the person receiving the
services could reasonably believe that the nonlegal services are the subject of an
attorney-client relationship.
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(4) For purposes of paragraphs (a)(2) and (a)(3). it will be presumed that
the person receiving nonlegal services could not reasonably believe that the
nonlegal services are the subject of an attorney-client relationship if the lawyer
or law firm has advised the person receiving the services in writing that the
services are not legal services and that the protection of an attorney-client rela-
tionship does not exist with respect to the nonlegal services, or if the interest of
the lawyer or law firm in the entity providing nonlegal services is de minimis.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a), a lawyer or law
firm that is an owner, controlling party, agent, or is otherwise affiliated with an
entity that the lawyer or law firm knows is providing nonlegal-services to a per-
son shall not permit any nonlawer providing such services or affiliated with
that entity to direct or regulate the professional judgment of the lawyer or law
firm in rendering legal services to any person, or to cause the lawyer or law firm
to compromise its duties under Rules 1.6(a) and 1.8(b) with respect to the confi-
dentialiy of information relating to the representation of a client receiving legal
services.
(c) For purposes of Rule 5.7, "nonlegal services" shall mean those serv-
ices that lawyers may lawfully provide and that are not prohibited as the unau-
thorized practice of law when provided by a nonlawver.
Comment
[1] For many years, lawyers have provided nonlegal services to their cli-
ents. By participating in the delivery of these services, lawyers can serve a
broad range of economic and other interests of clients. When a lawyer performs
la -related nonlegal services or controls an organization that does so, there-m-
Sthe potential for ethal problems. the lawyer must avoid confusion on the
part of the client as to the nature of the lawyer's role, so Prineipal-amng-hese
is -the-pssibilit that the person for whom the law -related nonlegal services are
performed understands fails to "anderstand that the services may not carry with
them the protections normally afforded as part of the client-lawyer relationship.
The recipient of the haw-related nonlegal services may expect, for example, that
the protection of client confidences, prohibitions against representation of per-
sons with conflicting interests, and obligations of a lawyer to maintain profes-
sional independence apply to the provision of law-rehtted nonlegal services
when that may not be the case.
[21 The risk of confusion is especially acute when the lawyer renders both
legal and nonlegal services with respect to the same matter. Under some cir-
cumstances, the legal and nonlegal services may be so closely entwined that
they cannot be distinguished from each other. In this situation, the recipient is
likely to be confused as to whether and when the relationship is protected as a
client-lawyer relationship. Therefore, where the legal and nonlegal services are
not distinct, Rule 5.7(a)(1) requires that the lawyer providing nonlegal services
adhere to all of the requirements of the Rules of Professional Conduct with re-
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spect to the nonlegal services. Rule 5.7(a)(1) applies to the provision of nonlegal
services by a lawyer even when the lawyer is not personally providing any legal
services to the person for whom the nonlegal services are being performed if the
person is also receiving legal services from another lawyer in the firm that are
not distinct from the nonlegal services.
2% [31 Although a lawyer may be exempt from the application of the
Rules of Professional Conduct with respect to nonlegal services on the face of
Rule 5.7(a), the scope of the exemption is not absolute. A lawyer who provides
or who is involved in the provision of nonlegal services may be excused from
compliance with only those Rules that are dependent upon the existence of a
representation or attorney-client relationship. Other Rules, such-as those pro-
hibiting lawyers from engaging in illegal, dishonest, fraudulent or deceptive
conduct (Rule 8.4), reouiring lawyers to report certain attorney misconduct
(Rule 8.3), and prohibiting lawyers from misusing confidential information of a
former client (Rules 1.6 and 1.8(b)), apply to a lawyer irrespective of the exis-
tence of a representation, and thus govern a lawyer otherwise exempt under
Rule 5.7(a). A lawyer or law firm is always subiect to the Rules of Professional
Conduct with respect to the rendering of legal services. . "
~on~ of k.,w rel-ted series I. lly e e-enh-~~erde-
.,,,Xlhf .o "h i..1i -
legal .... 1- __ °i eperformed. The Ro-orL of t " "
..... i.i...l i.rel . t t jaiy v on of lard teds- on
Even when tho-se e a-± 1stanees do-not ---2t Lo er-He., the.ol~t f a lyer
inolved in the provisioni of law -A m "ebllSL~L oth
R-ties that apjl ~~Jjt gnr lly e code,,e.de of-vhAte. the eoJ .
involve,, the provision of --I M S., -, l k. .L
+8+ [41 Even when the lawyer believes that the provision of nonlegal serv-
ices is distinct from any legal services being provided, there is still a risk that
the recipient of the nonlegal services might reasonably believe that the recipi-
ent is receiving the protection of an attorney-client relationship Therefore.
Rule 5.7(a)(2) requires that the lawyer providing the nonlecal services adhere to
the Rules of Professional Conduct, unless exempted. hen-la%-s.relzae-serz
are provided by -----e. u.nde. - trot~ ... tJ~i. h
... j,.. poslon Lf i vie , .er-in -pro%+Hng-the
la,,-; ated servees must adhere to tho
si.genal n-" a.. .r.ovided i. Rile 5..E7)(, ).
f4f [5] law-related Nonlegal services also may be provided through an en-
tit th o dt.et from tha.t threough %e hr -a~yrpoJelb
with which a lawyer is affiliated, for example, as owner. controlling party or
agent. In this situation, there is still a risk that the recipient of the nonlegal
services might reasonably believe that the recipient is receiving the protection
of an attorney-client relationship. Therefore, Rule.5.7(a)(3) requires that the
lawyer involved with the entity providing nonleal services adhere to all the
Rules of Professional Conduct with respect to the nonlepal services, unless ex-
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empted .the laye. dividally o.r wth other. has ontrol of ch .-an-en
oper.ations, the Rule reuies the laye to take resn'lemaue to assUre
that each person using thee i. es of the e i it.y ows that tL
..ded by the entt ae not legal ae. i .ad tha.t the lf
ronduet tha.t .elate to the .ient- y e .elat.onshp4 do not A awyeA I
]t hu of ano etty etends to the ability to direct i d in. aeter-a
lawyer has direc etrovies o iend upon t e -iedintces of the oolear
ease
E51 When a elie..t laye relationship e~iss -t a person . o 4s refc,
by a lawye. to aseparate law related nonlegal ser.e enit eentrolled by tLA.
layr indJiidually or with others, the lawye. must eomply with flle 8(a).
[6] The Rules of Professional Conduct will be presumed not to apply to a
lawyer who directly provides or is otherwise involved in the provision of nonle-
gal services if the lawyer complies with Rule 5.7(a)(4) by communicating in
writing to the person receiving the nonlegal services that the services are not
legal services and that the protection of an attorney-client relationship does not
exist with respect to the nonlegal services. Such a communication should be
made before entering into an agreement for the provision of nonlegal services.
in a manner sufficient to assure that the person understands the significance ot
the communication. In certain circumstances, however, additional steps may be
required to communicate the desired understanding. For example, while the
written disclaimer set forth in Rule 5.7(a)(4) will be adequate for a sophisticated
user of legal and nonlegal services, a more detailed explanation may be required
for someone unaccustomed to making distinctions between legal services and
nonlegal services. The lawyer or law firm will not be reauired to comply with
these requirements if its interest in the entity providing the nonlegal services is
so small as to be de minimis. I. taing the .. asonable -sures ref-ed- to in
paarp (a)(2) to asur that a prson using law-elated sevie unders0 tands
the praetieal effeet or signfieanee of the inappliability of the Rmales of rof
to1a ond1et, the lawye.r should eo u ...ate to the person r"- . g te
law related s ,, ,ces J aane, sa.ff.ie.nt to assure tha-H-the Fper1 -U er-
0 t~Jsth~ s c~eeof theat, that the relationship of the person toth
buies entitLOO y wtft not be a eh.en., fawv yer * vatiwonip. The eo I ucmo
should be made before enterin.g into a ag.. .e fprovisionif or-providing
law related s rve^_ and prefe.ably shoa.d be i .
[71 The burden is upon the lawvye. to show that the lawyer has ta-3en-rca-
sonable measures under the AV-PlIMtAV4cs to eomnet the desihe d nder-
standig. For t..e, a sophisthica.ted use. of law, related saevees, h u-as
pujLJy nl.t eor-poration, may requta a fesser expia 1nation OMauu,,t-
... stmed to makng distinetions between legal --- v"ee a.. .aw-reated-serv-
.. _such as ..... -ndiviu seeking tax... advice from a lawvyer acou. b ... or
vestigaab, Ve mo wC aaWCW~Lb. yithL a ,awsmr.
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serviees, a lavrye. should take- special care to k'eep s-e-.a=te--LL. pision-of
law-relateed and ,-Ieg.-. o~~ett that-the-rcii..
vvHas~ that the- la;.Atdsr'e .. leo e LJ-f~~h
ofitsion is espeeial; aeute-tvhen- the a-.yeLuad . b t pes-of-servies
with respeet to the Under ntsbances-the-legand
law .relatee servies C.y eso'.lsely, entv-2d-ta-h~c,,o ed
guished from each other, and the reqieent of "0 nd t
~~~V L. pa..h()Cob h t~ a.., be mnet.Insca aal-yeJLLL.LI, ~ -! L'* -L LI.y LJ L.L*J oj
tent Aeqted b Rdle 5.3, that of nonla ye .em k"Apyeezi I.- A!
-hieh the law..e. eont.ol .. s-' emo.he •h .
eoni et[91 A bi cad Lange m'eooe ana other iterests-of cfenta .- e e e
by lawers' engaging in the de'ive.ro a.,eao ees.fy~~o
n ,...
anayi, ...... ... ,o , psycholo.O " " =*-, " ,pr
medica or enviromen.tJ -Ae ultin.
{l I 1 When a lawyer is obliged to accord the recipients of such services
the protections of those Rules that apply to the client-lawyer relationship, the
lawyer must take special care to heed the proscriptions of the Rules addressing
conflict of interest (Rules 1.7 through 1.11, especially Rules 1.7(b) and 1.8(a),(b)
and (f)), and to scrupulously adhere to the requirements of Rule 1.6 relating to
disclosure of confidential information. The promotion of the lar-related nonle-
gal services must also in all respects comply with Rules 7.1 through 7.3, dealing
with advertising and solicitation. In that regard, lawyers should take special
care to identify the obligations that may be imposed as a result of a jurisdic-
tion's decisional law.
E11 'When the EcH proteetions of al of the "t..es of -r^o- on- "on"M"
do not apply to the pr.ovision of law- .eated ' of aT-ewernnl
to the Ruales, for exa.mple, the law oA.FLnA.Lk...d ogent, -the legaltluties
owe to the.se r.e eii -" s thb e - e. Thoise o the~ rb~ 1.n~k p~~.sal
a different degree of protection for th e-.eeqent -t - o
of information, eonffiets of nt--esta..d-pernisble busntess- .Ja'eon*sh-s tith
ei.nts. See lso Rle 8.4 , sonduet)
Rule 5.8 Contractual Relationships Between Lawyers And Nonlegal
Professionals
(a) A lawyer or law firm may enter into and maintain a contractual rela-
tionship with a nonlegal professional or nonleyal professional service firm for
the purpose of offering to the public, on a systematic and continuing basis, legal
services performed by the lawyer or law firm, as well as other professional
services, notwithstanding the provisions of Rule 1.7(b), provided that:
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(1) The profession of the nonlegal professional or nonlegal professional
service firm is listed by the [high court of the state] pursuant to Rule 5.8(b): and
(2) The lawyer or law firm neither grants to the nonlegal professional or
nonlegal professional service firm, nor permits such person or firm to obtain,
hold or exercise. directly or indirectly, any ownership or investment interest in,
or managerial or supervisory right, power or position in connection with, the
practice of law by the lawyer or law firm: and
(3) The fact that the contractual relationship exists is disclosed to any
client of the lawyer or law firm to whom nonlegal professional services are pro-
vided.
(b) For purposes of Rule 5.8(a):
(1) Each profession on the list maintained by the [high court of the
state] shall have been designated by it sua sponte or shall have been approved
by it upon the application of an individual or firm in this State, upon a determi-
nation that the profession is composed of individuals who, with respect to their
profession:
(i) have been awarded a Bachelor's Deree or its equivalent from an ac-
credited college or university
(ii) are licensed to practice the profession by an agency of this State or
the United States Government, and
(iii) are required under penalty of suspension or revocation of license to
adhere to a code of ethical conduct that is reasonably comparable to that of the
legal profession.
(2) The term "ownership or investment interest" shall mean any such in-
terest in any form of debt or equity, and shall include any interest commonly
considered to be an interest accruing to or enjoyed by an owner or investor.
(c) Rule 5.8(a)(1) shall not applv to relationships consisting solely of re-
ciprocal referral agreements or understandings between a lawyer or law firm
and a nonlegal professional or nonlegal professional service firm.
(d) Notwithstanding Rule 5.4(a), a lawyer or law firm may allocate costs
and expenses with a nonlegal professional or nonlegal professional service firm
pursuant to a contractual relationship permitted by Rule 5.8(a), provided the
allocation reasonably reflects the costs and expenses incurred or expected to be
incurred by each.
Comment
[I Rule 5.8 permits lawyers to enter into interprofessional contractual
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relationships for the systematic and continuing provision of le I and nonlegal
professional services provided the nonlegal professional or nonlegal professional
service firm with which the lawyer or law firm is affiliated does not own, con-
trol, supervise or manage, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part the practice
of law by the lawyer or law firm. The nonlegal professional or nonleal profes-
sional service firm may not Play a role in, for example, the decision whether to
accept or terminate an engagement to provide lemal services in a particular
matter or to a particular client, determining the manner in which lawyers are
hired or trained, the assignment of lawyers to handle particular matters or to
provide legal services to particular clients, decisions relating to the undertaldng
of pro bono publico and other public-interest legal work, financial and budget-
ary decisions relating to the legal practice, or determining the compensation
and advancement of lawyers and of persons assisting lawyers on legal matters.
[21 The contractual relationship permitted by Rule 5.8 may provide for the
reciprocal referral of clients by and between the lawyer or law firm and the
nonlegal professional or nonlegal professional service firm. It may also provide
for the sharing of premises, general overhead, or administrative costs and serv-
ices on an arm's length basis. Such financial arrangements, in the context of an
agreement between lawyers and other professionals to provide legal and other
professional services on a systematic and continuing basis, are permitted not-
withstanding that they involve the exchange of value for client referrals and,
technically, a sharing of professional fees, matters that are dealt with specifi-
cally in Rules 7.2(c) and 5.8(d).
[31 Similarly. lawyers participating in such arrangements remain subject
to general ethical principles in addition to those set forth in Rule 5.8 including,
at a minimum, Rules 1.7(a), 1.9, 5.4(c), 5.4(d) and 7.5(d). Thus, the lawyer or
law firm may not, for example, include in its firm name the name of the nonle-
gal professional service firm or any individual nonlegal professional, or enter
into formal partnerships with nonlawers. or practice in an- oranization
authorized to practice law for a profit in which nonlawyers own any interest.
Moreover, a lawyer or law firm may not enter into an agreement or arrange-
ment for the use of a name in respect of which a nonlegal professional or nonle-
gal professional service firm has or exercises a proprietary interest if, under or
pursuant to the areement or arrangement, that nonlemal professional or firm
acts or is entitled to act in a manner inconsistent with Rule 5.8(a)(2). More
generally. although the existence of a contractual relationship permitted by
Rule 5.8 does not by itself create a conflict of interest violating Rule 1.7(b)
whenever a law firm represents a client in a matter in which the nonlegal pro-
fessional firm's client is also involved, the law firm's interest in maintaining an
advantageous relationship with the nonlegal professional service firm might, in
certain circumstances, adversely affect the independent professional judgment
of the law firm, creating a conflict of interest.
[41 Each lawyer and law firm having a contractual relationship under
Rule 5.8 has an ethical duty to observe these Rules of Professional Conduct with
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respect to its own conduct in the context of the contractual relationship. For
example, the lawyer or law firm cannot permit its obligation to maintain client
confidences as required by Rules 1.6 and 1.8(b) to be compromised by the con-
tractual relationship or by its implementation by or on behalf of nonlawers in-
volved in the relationship. In addition, the prohibition in Rule 8.4(a) against a
lawyer or law firm circumventing a Rule of Professional Conduct through-ac-
tions of another applies generally to the lawyer or law firm in the contractual
relationship.
[51 When in the context of a contractual relationship permitted under Rule
5.8 a lawyer or law firm refers a client to the nonlegal professional or nonlegal
professional services firm, the lawyer or law firm shall observe the ethical stan-
dards of the legal profession in verifying the competence of the nonlegal profes-
sional or nonlegal professional service firm to handle the relevant affairs and
interests of the client. Referrals should only be made when requested by the
client or deemed to be reasonably necessary to serve the client.
[61 To assure that only appropriate professional services are involved,-a
contractual relationship for the provision of services is permitted under Rule 5.8
only if the nonlegal party thereto is a professional or professional service firm
meeting appropriate standards as regards ethics, education, training, and li-
censing. The [high court of the state] maintains a public list of eligible profes-
sions. Individuals and firms in this state may apply for the inclusion of par-
ticular professions on the list, or professions may be added to the list by the
[high court of the statel sua sponte. A lawyer or law firm not wishing to affili-
ate with a nonlawer on a systematic and continuing basis, but only to engage a
nonlawer on an ad hoc basis to assist in a specific matter, is not governed by
Rule 5.8 when so dealing with the nonlawer. Thus, a lawyer advising a client
in connection with a discharge of chemical wastes may engage-the services of
and consult with an environmental engineer on that matter without the need to
comply with Rule 5.8. Likewise, the requirements of Rule 5.8 need not be met
when a lawyer retains an expert witness in a particular litigation.
[7 Depending upon the extent and nature of the relationship between the
lawyer or law firm, on the one hand, and the nonlegal professional or nonlegal
professional service firm, on the other hand, it may be appropriate to treat the
parties to a contractual relationship permitted by Rule 5.8 as a single laNv firm
for purposes of these Rules of Professional Conduct, as would be the case if the
nonlegal professional or nonlegal professional service firm were in an "of coun-
sel" relationship with the lawyer or law firm. If the parties to the relationship
are treated as a single law firm, the principal effects relationship would be that
conflicts of interest are imputed as between them pursuant to Rule 1.10. To the
extent that the rules of ethics of the nonlegal profession conflict with these
Rules, the rules of the legal profession will still govern the conduct of the law-
yers and the law firm participants in the relationship. A lawyer or law firm
may also be subject to legal obligations arising from a relationship with non-
lawyer professionals who are themselves subject to regulation.
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Rule 7.2 Advertising
(a) Subject to the requirements of Rules 7.1 and 7.3, a lawyer may ad-
vertise services through public media, such as a telephone directory, legal direc-
tory, newspaper or other periodical, outdoor advertising, radio or television, or
through written or recorded communication.
(b) A copy or recording of an advertisement or communication shall be
kept for two years after its last dissemination along with a record of when and
where it was used.
(c) A lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for recom-
mending the lawyer's services except that
(1) a lawyer may
(i)-1) pay the reasonable costs of advertisements or communications per-
mitted by this Rule;
(Q (2) pay the usual charges of a not-for-profit lawyer referral service or
legal service organization; and
(fl (-) pay for a law practice in accordance with Rule 1.17.
(2) a lawyer or law firm may refer clients to a nonlemal Professional or
nonleaal professional service firm pursuant to an agreement or other contrac-
tual relationship with such nonlegal professional or nonlegal professional serv-
ice firm to provide legal and other professional services on a systematic and
continuing basis as permitted by Rule 5.8.
(d) Any communication made pursuant to this rule shall include the
name of at least one lawyer responsible for its content.
Comment
[11 To assist the public in obtaining legal services, lawyers should be al-
lowed to make known their services not only through reputation but also
through organized information campaigns in the form of advertising. Adver-
tising involves an active quest for clients, contrary to the tradition that a lawyer
should not seek clientele. However, the public's need to know about legal serv-
ices can be fulfilled in part through advertising. This need is particularly acute
in the case of persons of moderate means who have not made extensive use of
legal services. The interest in expanding public information about legal serv-
ices ought to prevail over considerations of tradition. Nevertheless, advertising
by lawyers entails the risk of practices that are misleading or overreaching.
[2] This Rule permits public dissemination of information concerning a
lawyer's name or firm name, address and telephone number, the kinds of serv-
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ices the lawyer will undertake; the basis on which the lawyer's fees are deter-
mined, including prices for specific services and payment and credit arrange-
ments; a lawyer's foreign language ability; names of references and, with their
consent, names of clients regularly represented; the nature or extent of nonlegal
services provided by the lawyer or by an entity owned and controlled by the
lawyer the existence of contractual relationships between the lawyer or law
firm and a nonlegal professional or nonlegal professional service firm, to the ex-
tent permitted by Rule 5.8, and the nature and extent of services available
through those contractual relationships' and other information that might in-
vite the attention of those seeking legal assistance.
[31 Questions of effectiveness and taste in advertising are matters of
speculation and subjective judgment. Some jurisdictions have had extensive
prohibitions against television advertising, against advertising going beyond
specified facts about a lawyer, or against "undignified" advertising. Television
is now one of the most powerful media for getting information to the public, par-
ticularly persons of low and moderate income; prohibiting television advertis-
ing, therefore, would impede the flow of information about legal services to
many sectors of the public. Limiting the information that may be advertised
has a similar effect and assumes that the bar can accurately forecast the kind of
information that the public would regard as relevant.
[4] Neither this Rule nor Rule 7.3 prohibits communications authorized by
law, such as notice to members of a class in class action litigation.
Record of Advertising
[51 Paragraph (b) requires that a record of the content and use of adver-
tising be kept in order to facilitate enforcement of this Rule. It does not require
that advertising be subject to review prior to dissemination. Such a require-
ment would be burdensome and expensive relative to its possible benefits, and
may be of doubtful constitutionality.
Paying Others to Recommend a Lawyer
[6] A lawyer is allowed to pay for advertising permitted by this Rule and
for the purchase of a law practice in accordance with the provisions of Rule 1.17,
but otherwise is not permitted to pay another person for channeling profes-
sional work. This restriction does not prevent an organization or person other
than the lawyer from advertising or recommending the lawyer's services. Thus,
a legal aid agency or prepaid legal services plan may pay to advertise legal
services provided under its auspices. Likewise, a lawyer may participate in
not-for-profit lawyer referral programs and pay the usual fees charged by such
programs. Paragraph (c) does not prohibit paying regular compensation to an
assistant, such as a secretary, to prepare communications permitted by this
Rule.
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[71 Reciprocal referrals of clients by and between a lawyer or law firm and
a nonlegal professional or nonlegal professional service firm pursuant to an in-
terprofessional contractual arrangement permitted by Rule 5.8 are excluded
from the scope of Rule 7.2(c).

